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FOREWORD
Sudha Setty*
As dean of Western New England University School of Law, I thank
the editors and staff of Volume 41 of the Western New England Law
Review for inviting me to contribute the foreword to this issue, which
offers an engaging, insightful, and thought-provoking set of articles and
notes that encourage law reform in different contexts. When considering
legal academic scholarship, the hope is that each article we read and
consider is a piece of the larger mosaic of knowledge and argument that
informs the nature, shortcomings, and potential of the law. Of course, law
reviews have been valued over many decades for their key function of
providing reference material for practitioners, judges, and policy makers,1
and, at times, for pushing those same individuals to consider reforming
the law to make it better, fairer, and more efficacious.2 As Sherrilyn Ifill,
now president of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, opined, “‘law review
articles offer muscular critiques on [sic] contemporary legal doctrine,
alternative approaches to solving complex legal questions, and reflect a
deep concern with the practical effect of legal decisionmaking on how law
develops in the courtroom.’”3 The set of articles in Issue 1 reflects the
best of what Ifill describes.
* Dean and Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.
1. See Christian C. Day, The Case for Professionally-Edited Law Reviews, 33 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 563, 563–64 (2007).
2. Consider the stated ambition of the founding editors of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review: “[T]o be a review of revolutionary law.” Editors, Preface, 1 HARV. CIV.
RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV., at iii (1966).
3. See Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Take on Academic Scholarship,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y: ACSBLOG (Jul. 5, 2011), available at https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/lawprof-ifill-challenges-chief-justice-roberts-take-on-academic-scholarship/
[https://perma.cc/FSW9-LB8E] (quoting Danielle Citron, Sherrilyn Ifill on What the Chief
Justice Should Read on Summer Vacation, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 1, 2011),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/07/sherrilyn-ifill-on-what-the-chief-justiceshould-read-on-summer-vacation.html [https://perma.cc/Z6H8-2QQM]).
1
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This foreword also provides an opportunity for me to reflect briefly
on legal education more generally, and the role of law reviews in
particular. This is particularly apt in 2019, the centennial year of Western
New England University, which included legal education at its inception
in September 1919.4 One hundred years ago, our law teaching was not
focused on the “muscular critiques” we value in law reviews today, or on
law reviews at all. Instead, the institutional mission reflected the needs of
the greater Springfield community, providing an opportunity for legal
education that was available to the working public, with night classes
offered at the YMCA building in downtown Springfield.5 In 1919, one
full-time professor was hired to run what was then the Springfield division
of Northeastern College, and he worked with a cohort of part-time
teachers to start teaching law.6 As the bulletin in the Springfield Daily
News said in August 1919, “there will be offered during the evening
hours, at reasonable rates, course of study on the highest plane and leading
to marked efficiency.”7 It was, apparently, a good sales pitch, since
twenty-three students enrolled that fall to study law.8
We have come a long way as a university, just as legal education has
changed markedly over the course of a century. Yet some things remain
the same. We still offer a course of study that engages students on the
highest plane while also developing their practical skills through a deep
institutional commitment to experiential learning. Our faculty prioritizes
working with our students as they grow into thoughtful, ethical, and
engaged lawyers. This emphasis comes naturally to Western New
England, which has, for its one hundred years, been student-centered and
focused on providing educational experiences that build skills and prepare
students for real-world lawyering. The Law Review is a part of that
endeavor, as it has been for the forty-one years of its existence. The 1992
American Bar Association (ABA) MacCrate Report9 and the 2007

4. University History, W. NEW ENG. UNIV., https://www1.wne.edu/about/history.cfm
[https://perma.cc/XAA8-DWQA].
5. ROSEMARY K. O’DONOGHUE, WESTERN NEW ENGLAND: FROM COLLEGE TO
UNIVERSITY viii (2012), https://www1.wne.edu/university-archives/doc/WNE_History.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3RXB-LZFZ].
6. Id.
7. BEAUMONT A. HERMAN, W. NEW ENGLAND COLLEGE: A CALLING TO FULFILL 4
(1980).
8. See id. at 5.
9. See generally SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N,
THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE
GAP (1992) (outlining the needs of the U.S. legal profession and recommending increases in
skills- and values-based education in law schools).
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Carnegie Report10 emphasized the need for skills-based learning in law
schools. In 2004, the ABA adopted standards which required that
“student[s] receive substantial instruction in . . . other professional skills
generally regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation
in the legal profession; . . .”11 Working on law review builds these skills;
as such, it is part of our core educational purpose,12 as practical lawyering
and skill-building continue to lie at the heart of Western New England’s
institutional mission.
Yet, the Law Review serves as much more than an educational
opportunity. In this issue, the authors, many of them practitioners with
decades of experience and expertise to draw upon, offer potential legal
reforms to help legal scholars, practitioners, and the public understand
possible shortcomings of the current state of the law and help law and
policy makers contemplate potential improvements. This service is
arguably more important now than any time in the last one hundred years,
as we are inundated with information from a seemingly endless variety of
news sources, blog posts, tweets, opinion columns, and other online
media. Such sources may inform, update, and provide contemporaneous
analysis; however, we must proceed knowing that this kind of information
supplements deep thinking and learning but does not supplant it. To
mistake the two carries enormous risk. As Malcolm Gladwell observed,
“I have sensed . . . an enormous frustration with the unexpected costs of
knowing too much, of being inundated with information. We have come
to confuse information with understanding.”13 The articles in this issue
reflect the deep thinking and learning that characterizes the best in legal
scholarship. They help us increase our understanding of complex issues
in the fields of criminal, tort, and constitutional law, and to encourage us
to consider how the law may be developing, or how the law should be
developed.
The issue begins with two thoughtful pieces that draw upon their
authors’ decades of experience as prosecutors in the federal and state
justice systems. In Mirroring the Trial: Making Sense of the Law of
10. See generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) (recommending an integrated approach to legal education
that incorporated legal theory, ethics, and practical skills).
11. See STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCH. 2004,
Standard 302(a)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004).
12. See Cameron Stracher, Reading, Writing, and Citing: In Praise of Law Reviews, 52
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 349, 360 (2007–2008).
13. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 264
(Back Bay Books 2007) (“We live in a world saturated with information. We have virtually
unlimited amounts of [information] at our fingertips at all times, and we’re well versed in the
arguments about the dangers of not knowing enough and not doing our homework.”).
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Closing Argument in Criminal Cases,14 Alex J. Grant, an Assistant United
States Attorney, provides a detailed consideration of the role of closing
arguments in federal criminal trials, and the significant limitations placed
upon prosecutors in that context. Grant argues for reform predicated on
the need for basic fairness in trials. Specifically, Grant advocates for
prosecutors to be granted more leeway during closing arguments to voice
their opinions regarding the credibility of the defendant and various
witnesses and to address and argue against potential jury nullification.
Grant argues that this greater flexibility would not only place prosecutors
and defense attorneys on a more even and—in Grant’s view—fairer
footing but would also create more consistency in the way in which courts
run trials.
The need to increase fairness in the criminal justice system is framed
in a different context in Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights: The Supreme Judicial Court’s “Cruel” and “Unusual” Neglect of
Its Longevity Component,15 by Thomas H. Townsend, Chief of the
Appellate Division of the Northwestern District Attorney’s Office in
Massachusetts. Townsend considers the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights—which predates and serves as a model for the United States
Constitution—and its prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.
Townsend encourages the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) to
exercise more power in discharging its duty to protect its citizens by
interpreting Article 26 as grounds for convicted defendants to challenge
the length of their sentences. Townsend notes that the SJC has previously
interpreted Article 26 in ways that are more protective of a defendant’s
rights under the United States Constitution. As such, Townsend advocates
for the SJC to rely upon Article 26 to develop a better framework for
determining fair and proportional sentences for crimes, such as statutory
rape, in which sentencing is currently—in Townsend’s view—incredibly
unfair and problematic.
The next two articles in Issue 1 come from practitioners with deep
experience in civil litigation and reflect their thoughtful approach to
important issues faced by real lawyers on an ongoing basis. In The
Wrongful Demise of But For Causation,16 Tory A. Weigand, drawing on
extensive experience and expertise in his field, advocates for reform to the
14. Alex J. Grant, Mirroring the Trial: Making Sense of the Law of Closing Argument in
Criminal Cases, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 7 (2019).
15. Thomas H. Townsend, Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: The
Supreme Judicial Court’s “Cruel” and “Unusual” Neglect of Its Longevity Component, 41 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (2019).
16. Tory A. Weigand, The Wrongful Demise of But For Causation, 41 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 75 (2019).
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way in which tort claims are litigated, beginning with an analysis of the
current framework for considering causation. He looks closely at
situations in which multiple potential causes for a tort exist and considers
the difficulty that courts and advocates have had in applying a substantial
factor test instead of relying on but for causation. Weigand makes the
case for reinstating the primacy of but for causation through a careful
analysis of Massachusetts case law and the cautionary language in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts with regard to the use (and potential overuse)
of the substantial factor test.
In Opt-Out and the Fourth Era of Workers’ Compensation: Has
Industry Left the Bargaining Table?,17 Daniel E. Walker takes a careful
look at the history of workers’ compensation to consider the feasibility
and constitutionality of efforts to use alternative benefit plans to manage
compensation for injured employees. Walker examines recent cases, such
as one in which an ERISA-governed alternative benefit plan was struck
down on constitutional grounds, to consider what lessons can be learned
by those seeking to craft similar plans in the future that might retain tort
immunity for employers while also limiting state oversight of the
administration of such plans. Walker’s careful analysis is contextualized
in his larger consideration of how industry lobbying has eroded older
models of workers’ compensation, and the likelihood that a new era of
workers’ compensation may be upon us.
The final two pieces in Issue 1 are student notes that take on important
constitutional matters that resonate strongly given current political hotbutton topics and the content and tenor of societal discourse. The subjects
considered in these notes implicate conversations covered widely in the
news, yet these authors do important work with their extensive, in-depth
and thoughtful scholarly analysis, making significant contributions to the
literature in their respective areas. In “See Ya in Boston, Bruh”: Making
the Link Between the Right of Petition, Activism, and the Massachusetts
Anti-SLAPP Statute,18 Heidi K. Waugh considers the protections provided
by the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP statute to those defending themselves
against defamation suits by claiming status as “petitioners” to the
government. Waugh notes that the statutory right to seek dismissal is one
way in which those who have legitimate, but controversial, government
petitions can have their First Amendment rights protected without getting

17. Daniel E. Walker, Opt-Out and the Fourth Era of Workers’ Compensation: Has
Industry Left the Bargaining Table?, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 111 (2019).
18. Heidi K. Waugh, Note, “See Ya in Boston, Bruh”: Making the Link Between the Right
of Petition, Activism, and the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 141
(2019).

SETTY. MACRO. 2.18.2019 (DO NOT DELETE)

6

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

2/28/2019 10:35 PM

[Vol. 41:1

bogged down in lengthy and costly litigation. Waugh observes that
modern political engagement and government petitioning take numerous
forms, and that Massachusetts courts must apply the state’s anti-SLAPP
statute consistently in order to preserve its purpose. Waugh considers
approaches used in other jurisdictions to suggest an assessment
framework for Massachusetts courts that would provide more consistency
and improve fairness.
In I Beg Your Pardon: Ex parte Garland Overruled; the Presidential
Pardon is No Longer Unlimited,19 Zachary J. Broughton takes a close look
at the current hot-topic of the scope of the president’s pardon power.
Broughton considers the broad pardon power supported by the United
States Supreme Court in Ex parte Garland in the context of limitations of
the pardon power articulated by the Supreme Court in more recent
decades. Through a careful parsing of pre-constitutional pardon powers
and the United States Supreme Court cases that have considered the
pardon power, Broughton argues that the expansive reading of the pardon
power in Ex parte Garland no longer holds, and that the Supreme Court
ought to make clear that the pardon power is limited and subject to judicial
review.
Justice Cardozo once famously cautioned against the “tendency of a
principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.”20 The six authors in this
issue take up that cause, challenging us to consider the history, logic, and
justice of various principles in criminal, civil, and constitutional law. In
doing so, they ask all readers, including policy and law makers, to
reconsider the principles undergirding these disparate areas of law with
the benefit of their deep thinking and careful research on these subjects.
As we mark one hundred years at Western New England University, I can
think of nothing better to exemplify the thoughtful and engaging work that
the School of Law seeks to inspire than these articles; they encourage us
to follow Justice Cardozo’s guidance and to determine for ourselves
whether the laws examined here, and how those laws are implemented,
have reached the limits of their logic.

19. Zachary J. Broughton, Note, I Beg Your Pardon: Ex parte Garland Overruled; the
Presidential Pardon is No Longer Unlimited, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 183 (2019).
20. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Lecture II: The Methods of History, Tradition and Sociology,
in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51, 51 (Yale Univ. Press 1921).

